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Executive summary
• The European Central Bank’s November 2019 Financial Stability Review highlighted the 
risks to growth in an environment of global uncertainty. It also discusses sovereign-debt 
concerns in case interest rates increase, and risks arising from household and corporate 
debt. It assesses the risks from a possible overvaluation of asset prices, and evaluates 
risks within the banking and non-banking system, and climate risks. On the whole, the 
ECB report is comprehensive and covers the main risks to euro-area financial stability. 
However, some issues deserve more attention.
• First, the assessment of risks in the housing market should be more nuanced. Current 
housing markets relative to those pre-crisis seem to be far less driven by mortgage credit, 
and the size of the construction sector has not increased. This is possibly good news for 
financial stability because a house price correction would transmit less into mortgage 
defaults and corrections to economic activity.
• Second, there should be greater emphasis on changes in market expectations of interest 
rates, which can have substantial effects on asset prices. This could be particularly rele-
vant if interest rate changes are not driven by real-economy developments. 
• Third, the financial system relies on a safe asset as a reference. We show that the supply 
of safe sovereign assets in the euro area has fallen dramatically, driven by deteriorating 
sovereign credit ratings and reduced supplies of bonds from the safest countries. More 
safe assets would support financial stability. 
• Fourth, though climate risks to financial stability must be taken seriously, risk weights on 
green assets should not be reduced since they still contain normal financial stability risks. 
Instead, risk weights for brown assets should be increased.
• Fifth, the ECB does not consider cybersecurity and hybrid threats in its assessment. These 
threats are significant risks for financial institutions and at the more systemic level. 
• Policies to address financial-stability concerns include macroprudential measures. In this 
respect, we discover discrepancies between EU countries: countries with the same levels 
of house-price overvaluation have adopted very different macroprudential measures. 
Some countries might thus have done too much, while others have done too little.
• When it comes to preventing the next recession or reducing its impact, we argue that EU 
policymakers need to be better prepared to use discretionary fiscal policy earlier and 
more forcefully, in particular because the ability of monetary authorities to react to the 
next cyclical downturn is very limited.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, written at the request of the European Parliament, we critically analyse the 
European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) November 2019 Financial Stability Review. On the whole, we 
think that the report is very comprehensive and covers the key risks to financial stability in the 
euro area. 
As always in such assessments, it is relatively easy to argue where risks could emerge but it 
is much more difficult to quantify the size of the risks and rank them in terms of importance. 
In addition, given the radical uncertainty resulting from the unpredictability of politics and 
socio-economic and natural developments at the current juncture, totally unexpected risks 
could emerge. Unfortunately, we cannot solve this problem in our short paper. Nevertheless, 
through a combination of literature review and data analysis, we complement the ECB’s 
analysis in a number of ways. 
Housing markets have historically often been one of the key factors in financial crises, as 
was the case, for example, in the great crisis of 2008-11. We therefore decided to take a deeper 
look into housing in section 3. In section 3, we also discuss in some detail changes to market 
expectations and their consequences. We zoom in on the importance of a safe asset for 
financial markets. Finally, we emphasise two risks that the ECB and the European Parliament 
should prioritise: climate risks and cyber risks to financial stability. We then provide an over-
view of one of the key policy instruments for achieving financial stability, so-called macropru-
dential policies. The last section concludes.
We highlight that we have not discussed the risks related to the incomplete set-up of 
monetary union and in particular banking union. Certainly, the current system will be better 
equipped to deal with shocks from failing or likely-to-fail banks than before banking union, 
but the set-up remains fragile. Questions of liquidity provisioning in resolution and differ-
ences of insolvency regimes are key concerns. We also have left aside the question of whether 
the currently high degree of monetary accommodation in itself is contributing to or reducing 
financial stability – a hotly debated topic.
2 A summary of the ECB’s assessment of 
key risks 
The November 2019 ECB Financial Stability Review (hereafter ECB, 2019c) is a comprehen-
sive and useful report assessing various aspects of financial stability risks in the euro area. We 
summarise the key messages of the report, and augment the assessment of some issues with 
our own findings in the next sections.
2.1 Prominent downside risks to economic growth, global environment
The euro area is experiencing an economic slowdown and the ECB expects near-term growth 
to remain modest. Growth and inflation projections have been revised downward. Manufac-
turing has been particularly affected and this vulnerability appears to be spreading. Current 
ECB projections expect growth in real GDP to be 1.1 percent in 2019, 1.2 percent in 2020 and 
1.4 percent in 2021. This slight and gradual recovery is expected to be aided by accommoda-
tive monetary policy, which could strengthen lending to corporates, and a mildly supportive 
fiscal stance. Global demand is also expected to improve, not least because of the January 
2020 trade agreement between China and the United States, which could help exports. 
That said, global geopolitical risks remain the most prominent downside risks. The January 
2020 China-US trade deal might just be a temporary pause in escalation of the trade conflict, 
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with the deal leaving most of the recently introduced tariff measures in place. According to 
the October 2019 International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook, US-China 
trade tension will cumulatively reduce the level of global GDP by 0.8 percent by 2020, which 
was a major reason for the downgrade of the global economic outlook. The IMF argued that 
subdued growth is a consequence of rising trade barriers, elevated uncertainty surrounding 
trade and geopolitics, idiosyncratic factors causing macroeconomic strain in several emerging 
market economies, and structural factors, including low productivity growth and aging demo-
graphics in advanced economies.
In Europe, a no-deal Brexit has been avoided. Under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, 
the transition period during which the United Kingdom will remain a member of the EU’s 
customs union and single market will last until the end of 2020. However, there are major 
uncertainties about whether and what kind of trade and financial services agreement will be 
concluded between the EU and the UK for the period following the transition period. While 
European and British institutions have made comprehensive preparations for an eventual 
abrupt end to the passporting rights enjoyed by UK-based financial firms, an eventual failure 
of the EU and UK to agree on arrangements beyond the transition period would likely affect 
growth negatively on both sides of the channel. The growth effects would be concentrated 
in specific EU countries with close ties to Britain. However, the direct financial risks may be 
more limited.
The evolution of the US economy will be a key determinant of European economic and 
financial developments. US growth has remained robust, spurred on by record-low unem-
ployment, ample consumption and an appealing fiscal and monetary environment. However, 
the current economic expansion is by far the longest in the US’s post-war economic history 
and political developments (such as the election of a Democrat in the 2020 US presidential 
election) might change economic sentiment and bring the current US economic cycle to an 
end. 
Similarly, while the Chinese slowdown has so far been gradual, risks to growth are nega-
tively skewed and could result in a sharper decline, especially given the weakness caused by 
the trade conflict, the lack of clarity over available stimulus policies and the very high level of 
private debt.
A global economic slowdown could threaten financial stability in the euro area. Slower 
euro-area economic growth resulting from a global slowdown would reduce household 
incomes and corporate profits, and could threaten the ability to meet debt obligations, espe-
cially given high non-financial sector debt in some Member States. More vulnerable sover-
eigns could also come under strain. Global stock prices might also contract, spilling-over to 
the euro area, leading to a negative wealth effect. 
2.2 Sovereign debt concerns
Sovereign debt positions appear largely sustainable. The euro area’s fiscal position is expected 
as expansionary in 2019 and subsequent years. While debt-to-GDP remains above 85 percent, 
well above the Maastricht 60 percent benchmark, it is expected to fall given the generally large 
positive differential between the economic growth rate and the interest rate (see Darvas et al, 
2019, for a quantification and discussion of the growth-interest rate differential for all EU coun-
tries). Countries with sufficient fiscal space are counselled to make use of it, while for those with 
less-sustainable debt positions, prudence is the order of the day, according to the ECB report. 
Sovereign debt sustainability is aided by benign financing conditions. Many euro-area 
countries have used recent low interest rates (across the yield curve) to extend the average 
maturities of their debts, reducing refinancing needs. Most hold ample liquidity buffers. 
That said, a more pronounced downturn could pose risks for countries with medium to 
high levels of debt. Debt sustainability could suffer especially if risk premiums rise as a result. 
Political and policy uncertainty could also expose sovereign debt to greater vulnerability, 
especially for Member States in need of a significant share of debt refinancing. Overall global 
pessimism could undermine the current favourable financing conditions.
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2.3 Household resilience and a growing housing market 
Household real disposable incomes are growing, given the favourable labour market outlook. 
Bank lending to households, especially mortgage lending, remains solid in some parts of the 
euro area, while in other parts (typically in countries with higher public debts, weaker banks, 
weaker growth outlooks) credit is hardly growing. Throughout the euro area, a slowdown 
appears to be on the horizon with indicators beginning to paint a more pessimistic picture.
Household debt remains broadly stable throughout the euro area, standing at 95 percent 
of disposable income and 58 percent of GDP (though this hides substantial variation, from 
40 percent of disposable income in Latvia and Lithuania, to 200 percent in the Netherlands). 
That said, the Netherlands has seen recent deleveraging, as have Spain, Portugal and Ireland. 
France, by contrast, appears to be re-leveraging. Household repayment capacity remains 
robust, especially given the interest rate environment. But a significant downturn could put 
this into question.
There are signs of over-valuation in the residential housing markets according to the ECB 
report (on average above 7 percent, although divergence is widespread). In contrast, com-
mercial real estate appears to be in a downturn, although the market continues to grow in 
countries that were most heavily affected by the crisis, including Greece and Spain.
Overall, according to the ECB’s assessment, property markets pose a growing risk to 
financial stability. The low-rate environment and strong labour market outlook could increase 
pressure on prices in the medium-term. At the same time, the negative growth outlook and 
risk of deteriorating financing conditions could place a strain on the sustainability of house-
hold and corporate debt. Foreign investors are more significantly affected by the evolution of 
global financial markets.
2.4 Corporate debt
Corporate profits have been negatively affected by the growth outlook, with declining busi-
ness sentiment and increasingly competitive markets. These profits and the subsequent fall in 
retained earnings could affect future investment and medium-term profits. Retained earnings 
remain the main overall source of finance expansion. 
The level of corporate debt is high but stable (and has been for several quarters), although 
divergences between countries remain significant (and some surpass the 75 percent of GDP 
threshold implied in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure). That said, the performance 
of credit default swaps (CDS) for corporate bonds would indicate the market believes credit 
risk is small.
Low interest rates and liquidity buffers recently accumulated by companies further 
increase the sustainability of corporate debt. Furthermore, the increase in market financing 
reduces dependence on the banking sector and the risks to corporations of banking sector 
vulnerabilities.
While overall risks remain under control, specific companies should be carefully mon-
itored according to the ECB. Companies with high-yield corporate bonds seem to have 
increased both their gross and net leverage, while investment grade companies have slightly 
deleveraged. Furthermore, the increase of risk premiums in case of downturn is troubling. 
There has been increased issuance of BBB-rated corporate bonds in the past five years, as well 
as of corporate bonds with an already high leverage ratio. The possible downgrade of these 
in case of aggregate economic weakness would cause a large increase in risk premiums and 
threaten debt sustainability. The average maturity of corporate bonds is also increasing, as 
shown in Chart 2.10 of ECB (2019c).
We add that the IMF’s October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019b) con-
cluded that worldwide, including in Europe, the profits of non-financial companies would be 
insufficient to service their increased debts if a downturn takes place that is only half as severe 
as the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
We also highlight the study by Couaillier et al (2020), which highlighted the deteriorated 
interest coverage ratio in France, which together with the high degree of leverage in the 
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corporate sector, result in vulnerabilities. By the end of 2018, vulnerable French companies 
had an aggregate gross debt of €187 billion, which could rise by 60 percent if their costs of 
financing increase by 100 basis points.
2.5 Risky assets and low rates 
The prices of riskier assets remain dependant on low rates. The prices of equities and corpo-
rate bonds have risen steadily, bar fluctuations arising from political uncertainty (the trade 
war, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit). This performance is well above growth in expected 
earnings or business sentiment. Using a dividend discount model, ECB (2019c) concludes 
that half of the increase in aggregate equity prices since the end of the euro-area sovereign 
debt crisis can be attributed to lower benchmark yields (Chart A on page 44).
The search for higher yield has resulted in increased demand for longer-maturity and 
lower credit-quality assets. While some risk-taking is an objective of loose monetary policy, 
continued low yields can result in misaligned valuations and increase the possibility of a 
stark price correction. US equity prices seem overvalued using both the unadjusted and the 
cyclically adjusted price/earnings (P/E) ratio, while the euro-area P/E ratio is close to the 
upper end of the historical distribution when using raw data, but well in the middle of the 
distribution when using cyclically adjusted data, suggesting fair valuation (Chart 2.9 on page 
43 of ECB, 2019c).
Low funding costs due to a very low and very flat term structure further incentivise com-
panies to leverage themselves. This may amplify the degree of re-pricing in a downturn. 
2.6 The banking sector
ECB (2019c) highlights cyclical and structural factors that contribute to weak profitability, and 
evaluates the resilience of the banking system in adverse scenarios. 
Bank profitability remains low in a historical comparison, driven by slowly growing 
net interest income, while net fee and commission income fell. Euro-area banks have high 
cost-to-assets and cost-to-income ratios. Some banks have sought to reduce branches and 
personnel and invest in digitalisation, yet a sub-sample of significant institutions (SIs) showed 
IT expenses were the main drivers of operating costs increases in 2014-18. Poor profitability 
performance remains widespread, yet banks in EU countries where the effects of the financial 
crisis were more significant remain weaker.
The evaluation of resilience uses a baseline and an adverse scenario. The adverse scenario 
assumes a significant downturn in 2021 (GDP fall by 1.7 percent, unemployment rate rises to 
10 percent), a 16 percent residential real estate price fall, and an increase in 130 basis points 
of the weighted average euro-area 10-year bond yield.
The baseline scenario sees a small fall in bank profitability, small changes in lending to 
non-financial corporates, while bank solvency improves with the aggregate Common Equity 
Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio rising by almost 1 percentage point to 15.3 percent in 2021. 
The adverse scenario implies significant losses surpassing 15 percent of bank equity, big 
falls in lending to non-financial corporates, and a fall in CET1 by 3.1 percentage points to 11.3 
percent. 
The ECB’s overall assessment is that the banking system remains largely resilient to major 
risks. The question is of course the likelihood of a scenario which is more adverse than the 
adverse scenario considered by the ECB.
2.7 Non-bank financial sector
The non-bank financial sector includes insurance corporations, pension funds, investment 
funds, money market funds and other financial institutions. The combined balance sheet of 
these non-bank financial institutions grew in the first half of 2019, because of inflows and 
valuation gains, and now represents 56 percent of total financial sector assets.
While valuation gains and inflows imply good news for the sector, their profitability is 
challenged by low yields. Nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of insurers’ and pension funds’ 
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bond holdings yield less than 1 percent (Chart 4.2 in ECB, 2019c). The low yield environment 
stimulates demand for riskier, longer-duration and less-liquid assets from non-bank finan-
cial entities, which can pro-cyclically affect prices and increase vulnerability, while maturity 
mismatch increases between liabilities and assets, leading to increased vulnerability to any 
re-pricing. Emerging market exposure is also increasing, though this remains small and also 
entails foreign-exchange risk. 
Despite these increasing vulnerabilities and risks, the ECB foresees a stable outlook for the 
sector.
2.8 Climate change
The May 2019 ECB Financial Stability Review included a comprehensive assessment of the 
channels through which climate change can affect financial stability. It illustrates with various 
data the exposure of euro-area financial institutions to risks from climate change (see pages 
120-133 of ECB 2019b). Notwithstanding the limited data availability, the analysis shows 
that climate change-related risks have the potential to become systemic for the euro area, in 
particular if markets do not price these risks correctly. The ECB report further highlighted 
the need for a forward-looking framework to improve the estimation of risks, and for better 
databases. 
The November 2019 ECB Financial Stability Review included a box on climate-related 
disclosures by banks and insurers and a brief analysis of their market impact (see pages 64-66 
of ECB 2019c). This box tackled the difficulty in gauging climate risks inherent in financial 
assets, which in turn complicates the assessment of how these risks could affect financial 
institutions. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol includes three ‘scopes’ of emissions for voluntary 
disclosure (direct, indirect from energy use and other indirect). However, financial firms dis-
close less than 30 percent of climate risks embedded in their financial assets (Chart A on page 
65 of ECB 2019c), even though emissions related to financial assets of financial firms are very 
significant. The ECB argues that inconsistent reporting might explain why disclosures appear 
to have no effect on market valuations for banks, in contrast to pension funds, for which the 
ECB finds a statistically significant correlation (Chart B on page 66 of ECB 2019c).
3 Financial stability issues requiring special 
attention
We broadly agree with the key messages of the ECB’s comprehensive analysis. In this section, 
we augment the ECB report by focusing on certain issues we believe require special attention.
3.1 The housing market
We complement the ECB’s analysis by comparing pre-crisis developments, which were un-
sustainable in some countries, with the recent episode of house price increases. Housing loan 
developments are available from the ECB only starting in January 2003, while the housing 
boom started earlier in some euro-area countries. Nevertheless, two important conclusions 
can be drawn from Figure 1. 
First, before 2008 there was a positive correlation between the speed of credit growth and 
house-price increases, suggesting that credit growth might have fuelled house-price growth. 
But this has not been the case in the past five years, since the correlation is rather weak. 
Certainly, there are some exceptions, such as in France in the pre-crisis period, where house 
prices increased very rapidly but credit growth was limited. Slovakia is an exception in the 
past five years since fast house-price increases there have coincided with rapid credit growth. 
But the big picture remains: in most euro-area countries credit growth does not appear to be 
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the most important driver of house-price increases in the past five years. This finding suggests 
reduced financial stability concerns compared to the pre-crisis period, because an eventual 
house-price correction will affect fewer borrowers and therefore impact less on bank profita-
bility. 
Second, in the pre-crisis period the share of construction in output increased to over 10 
percent in Ireland, Spain and Greece. Employment in the construction sector, and public-sec-
tor revenues related to construction, were therefore significant. The global and euro-area 
financial crisis led to massive contraction in construction, with increased unemployment and 
loss of fiscal revenues. By contrast, in France, the share of construction in output remained 
almost unchanged in the pre-crisis period, despite the very fast pace of credit growth, and 
thereby the global and euro-area crises did not cause major disruption. In the past five years, 
construction has not expanded much, suggesting again that an eventual housing bust would 
be less disruptive than it was in Greece, Ireland and Spain after 2008.
Figure 1: House price increases, housing loans and construction share of output, 
2004Q1-2008Q1 and 2014Q3-2019Q3
(A) House price increase and housing loans
(B) House price increase and construction share in output
Source: Bruegel using data from OECD for 2003-2008 house prices; Eurostat for 2014-2019 house prices and gross valued added for the 
total economy and for construction; ECB for house loans. Note: the share of construction in output refers to the maximum value reached 
during the sample period. Average % change in house prices and lending refers to average annual change.
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3.2 The unreliability of market expectations
While there has been a secular decline in safe real interest rates since the early 1980s (Del Ne-
gro et al, 2019), markets have been surprised by the continued fall in euro-area interest rates, 
as indicated by Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Euro interest rates and expectations, %
Source: Bruegel using data from Bloomberg.
Given that market expectations have been wrong many times in recent years, current 
expectations might turn out to be inaccurate too. The euro-area AAA-rated yield curve is 
below zero up to 14 years of maturity1. We regard an unexpected increase in the yield curve as 
more likely than an unexpected decline. 
Since the current low rates have raised valuations of equities, a key question is how much 
equity valuations will change if and when interest rates rise. The direct effect of an interest 
rate rise would be a fall in equity prices. However, the crucial factor would be the reason for 
the interest rate increase. 
Developments in the United States serve as a useful example. The Federal Reserve stopped 
net asset purchases in October 2014 and raised interest rates from December 2015. The effec-
tive federal funds rate increased from 0.1 percent in November 2015 to 2.4 percent in Decem-
ber 2018, while since October 2017, the Fed has even started to shrink its balance sheet, 
withdrawing liquidity. Despite these significant monetary tightening measures, US stock 
markets have not crashed and volatility has hardly changed. Most likely, robust US economic 
growth (boosted by a fiscal stimulus and weakened by the trade disputes and weaker global 
growth) increased expected corporate profits, which counter-weighted the impact of interest 
rate increases and Fed balance sheet contraction. 
In Europe, too, the expected impact on equity prices of interest rate rises will likely depend 
on economic developments: if the economic outlook improves, higher interest might not lead 
to large equity price falls. But if interest rate increases are not accompanied by an improved 
economic outlook, equity prices could fall significantly. Equity prices could also fall signifi-
cantly if the currently expected mild slowdown turns out to be a more protracted slowdown, 
or even a recession, even if interest rates do not change. An eventual major US stock price fall 
would likely cause European equities to fall too.
A crucial issue is the possibly heterogeneous recovery from the current economic slow-
down in the euro area. There is the risk of differentiated growth – for example, western and 
1 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/financial_markets_and_interest_rates/euro_area_yield_curves/html/index.
en.html. 
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northern euro-area members could grow faster than southern European countries. Since 
western and northern euro-area members account for a large share of the euro area while the 
ECB considers the euro-area average, such an asymmetric development would lead to area-
wide interest rate increases, leading to interest rates that are too high for southern European 
countries. Such a situation would depress equity prices in the south and make economic 
recovery in southern countries even more difficult.
An asymmetric recovery could also have implications for public debt sustainability. If 
countries with higher public debt levels do not grow as much as countries lower debt levels, 
the currently favourable growth/interest rate differential might turn less favourable for coun-
tries with higher public debt levels. Coupled with domestic political risk, that might lead to an 
increase in risk premiums in some countries with weaker fiscal positions, which could further 
undermine fiscal sustainability, economic growth and financial stability, given the large gov-
ernment bond holdings of the banking system and the weaker economic performance. 
3.3 The shortage of safe assets
A sufficient supply of safe assets is essential for the smooth functioning of the financial sys-
tem. The pricing of financial instruments and their valuations depend on returns on safe as-
sets, while safe assets are also used as collateral in various transactions, including repurchase 
agreements. A low supply of safe assets is an important contributing factor to low interest 
rates. We miss a discussion in the ECB Financial Stability Review of the possible shortage of 
safe assets in the euro area. 
Safe assets can be issued by governments and EU institutions.
As regards general government debt securities, currently only three countries (Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have AAA credit ratings for their long-term debt. Figure 
3 shows that their outstanding stock is expected to decline in euro terms (because of budget 
surpluses) and even more as a share of GDP (because of the increase in nominal GDP).
The AA-rated countries are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland and France, while the 
A-rated countries are Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Italy’s 
current rating is BBB, along with Cyprus and Portugal. Greece is at B. 
Figure 3: Debt security liabilities of euro-area general governments by credit 
rating
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat for government debt securities and IMF WEO for gross public debt and GDP, S&P ratings. Note: 
Eurostat data on government debt securities is available up to 2018. For our projections for 2019-2024, we assumed that the 2018 ratio 
of government debt securities to gross public debt remains the same and we use the IMF WEO projection for public debt in 2019-2024.
Meanwhile, the supply of safe assets from EU institutions such as the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) is relatively modest and has also been shrinking (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Outstanding stock of euro-denominated debt securities by credit rating, 
€ billions
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg data for the outstanding stocks, and their S&P rating, of euro-denominated bank and non-bank debt 
securities (irrespective whether the issuer is domiciled in the euro area or not); Bloomberg data for the stock of supranational entity’s 
bonds (which include the EU, EIB, European Stability Mechanism, and European Financial Stability Facility). For government debt securi-
ties we use our projection for 2019 as explained in the note to Figure 3.
To address concern about the low supply of safe assets, we would encourage European 
policymakers to pursue three avenues. First, the top-rated euro-area countries, in particular 
Germany, should not further reduce their absolute levels of debt. In a negative interest-rate 
environment, there surely must be projects with positive returns which could be funded by 
borrowing. Second, Figure 3 also shows that the supply of safe assets would be significantly 
increased if the ratings of less-well-rated countries improved. To a significant extent, this is a 
question of boosting long-term productivity growth. We consider therefore reforms boosting 
such growth to be fundamental also for the smooth functioning of the financial system. Third, 
it would be desirable for the euro area in particular to issue a common bond. If the EIB and 
other institutions could increase their supplies of bonds to fund economically and publicly 
sensible investments, for example green projects, financial stability would improve. The key 
argument is that credible fiscal actors should increase the supply of bonds to contribute to 
rising rates. Moreover, if less-well-rated bonds became safe assets, this would also increase 
the supply of safe bonds, helping to increase the interest rates on safe assets on which much 
financial market pricing is based.
3.4 Climate change
Financial risks can also result from climate change and its expected and unexpected con-
sequences. The ECB’s report calls for mandatory and harmonised firm-level reporting. This 
would allow better pricing and monitoring of financial institutions’ exposures to climate-re-
lated risks, even if assessing firm-level risks to climate change is a complicated exercise.
Bolton et al (2020) regard price and financial stability as the primary mandate of a central 
bank, but fulfilling the mandate is challenged by climate-related risks. Therefore, they call for 
a more pro-active approach to coordinating central banks’ responses to climate-related risks. 
Coordination with other public authorities and with the private sector also seems necessary 
for sufficient preparation in the face of climate risks. 
We recommend that Members of the European Parliament push the ECB and other finan-
cial supervisory authorities to pay significantly more attention than currently to the impact of 
climate risks on financial stability. In the near term, we see a concrete task for Members of the 
European Parliament: fostering legislation on mandatory and harmonised firm-level report-
ing of emissions (and of climate-change related risks more broadly). Only comprehensive 
reporting by firms will enable the proper monitoring of financial institutions’ exposures to 
climate-related risks. Proper reporting would allow better pricing of non-financial firms and 
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banks. We would also like to stress that in terms of regulation, increasing capital requirements 
for ‘brown’ assets is in our view the appropriate way to capture the additional risk resulting 
from climate change. Decreasing the capital requirements on ‘green’ assets could undermine 
the credibility of green finance, since other risks remain unchanged.
3.5 Cybercrime
ECB (2019a) presents a banking risk assessment, which includes cybercrime and IT disrup-
tion as one of three main drivers of risk in the banking system. Such risks could potentially 
disrupt the functioning of financial markets. However, the November 2019 ECB Financial 
Stability Review (ECB 2019c) referred to the issue only once – and briefly. Demertzis and Wolff 
(2019) documented the rise in cyber-attacks throughout the EU, highlighting the fact that 
while some institutions have implemented significant safeguards (the efficiency of which is as 
of yet unclear), very little has been done at Eurosystem level to ensure all financial institutions 
are adequately protected. Demertzis and Wolff (2019) further called for the integration of the 
EU’s broader security architecture, for example with centralised screening of FDI flows. 
In our assessment, the ECB and European policymakers more broadly need to pay 
significantly more attention to the risks arising from cyberattacks for the stability of the EU’s 
financial system. We recommend that MEPs emphasise this point in their hearing.   
3.6 Digital currencies
The ECB report does not mention digital currencies. Digital cryptocurrencies have seen 
significant volatility in recent years. In our assessment, the market for digital currencies is 
still relatively small, so financial stability concerns are limited. Nevertheless, there have been 
warnings of the risks to financial stability that could arise from the proliferation of digital cur-
rencies in the future, including from Mark Carney (as reported by Reuters, 2019), Randal K. 
Quarles (2019) and the BIS (2019). Central bank digital currencies could result in cyclical runs 
on banks (given popular access to central bank reserves) and reduced financial intermedia-
tion (Claeys and Demertzis, 2019). We would therefore recommend that increased attention 
should be paid to various forms of digital currency from the point of view of financial stability.
4 Macroprudential measures to address 
risks
Macroprudential measures adopted in euro-area countries can be roughly divided into 
two primary groups: capital-based and borrower-based measures. Capital-based measures 
introduce minimum regulatory capital requirements, while borrower-based measures focus 
on lending conditions and impose a maximum threshold on credit. These measures have 
recently been employed to target potentially over-heated residential real-estate markets.
The primary capital requirement macroprudential measure employed in the euro area is 
the capital conservation buffer (CCoB), a capital buffer on banks’ total exposure that works as 
an additional safeguard to the 4.5 percent requirement of Common Equity Tier 1 capital2. 
Additionally, counter-cyclical capital buffers (CCyB) have been introduced to counter the 
pro-cyclicality inherent to the financial system. This buffer is activated when cyclical systemic 
risk is increasing in the banking sector. The subsequent build-up of capital during booms 
should support the credit supply in the cycle downswing. Figure 5 shows which euro-area 
countries have introduced counter-cyclical capital buffers.
2 https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/capital/html/index.en.html.
12 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚2 | February 2020
Figure 5: Countercyclical capital buffer requirements, % of bank total exposure
Source: Bruegel using data from ESRB. Note: Decision rates up to end of 2020 (as of December 2019).
A third capital requirement in place in some euro-area countries is the systemic risk buffer 
(SyRB), which protects the financial system against longer term and non-cyclical risks. It may 
be applied at different levels to all institutions or a group of institutions, on all exposures or a 
collection of exposures. Current rates are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Systemic risk buffer requirements, % of total bank exposure
Source: Bruegel using data from ESRB.
Finally, global systemically important institutions (G-SII) have a compulsory additional 
surcharge or buffer that raises the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 capital they have to hold. 
Similarly, other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs), designated by member states, 
must also meet supplementary requirements to their Tier 1 Capital.
Additionally, risk assessments of residential real estate markets sometimes lead to the 
introduction of measures that focus on three aspects, as argued by ESRB (2019): the collateral 
stretch (concentrated on price misalignments and house-price evolution), the lending stretch 
(assesses the evolution of lending) and the household stretch (concentrates on household 
balance sheets and their potential vulnerabilities). Two types of borrower-based measures 
have been employed to prevent residential real estate from over-heating. First, loan-to-value 
(LTV) and loan-to-collateral (LTC) measures limit credit, based on collateral to address the 
collateral stretch. Second, debt-service-to-income (DSTI) and debt/loan-to-income (D/LTI) 
measures limit credit based on household income to address the household/income stretch. 
Additionally, counter-cyclical capital buffers address the lender stretch.
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Figure 7: Use of residential real estate instruments
Source: Bruegel using data from ESRB, updating and extending from slide 11 of Dierick (2018). Note: CCyB: counter-cyclical capital buff-
ers, DSTI: debt-service-to-income, D/LTI: debt/loan-to-income, LTV: loan-to-value, LTC: loan-to-collateral.
Given this state of play, it is worth comparing the deployment of these macropruden-
tial measures with indicators of residential real estate vulnerability. Measuring the latter is 
difficult. We use two indicators: house-price increases between 2014 and 2019, and the over/
under-valuation as estimated by the ECB (see Chart 1.14 of ECB, 2019c). The left panel of 
Figure 8 shows that Slovakia adopted the highest counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB). Some 
other countries had similar, or even faster, house-price increases, but adopted lower CCyB, or 
have not adopted buffers at all. 
A possible explanation for these differing responses in different countries could be that 
the house-price increase does not reflect well whether the housing market is overheated. For 
example, fast growth from a low level might not reflect a problem. We therefore also use the 
ECB’s estimate of house-price overvaluation in the right panel of Figure 8 on the next page. 
The message from this panel is even more controversial: while the ECB estimates that Aus-
trian and Luxembourgish house prices are overvalued by about 25-30 percent, Austria has not 
introduced any CCyB, while the Luxembourgish value is very low at 0.25 percent. In contrast, 
Slovakian housing prices are seen undervalued by the ECB, yet Slovakia implemented the 
largest CCyB.
A similar picture is evident when one considers borrower-based measures (Figure 9). We 
calculated a new index, which has a value of zero if no measures have been introduced, one 
if either measures addressing the collateral stretch (LTC and LTV) or the household stretch 
(DSTI and D/LTI) have been introduced, and two if measures addressing both of these have 
been introduced. Certainly, the strictness of measures could vary from country to country, 
even if they have the same score, which is a limitation of our index.
Luxembourg, Germany and Spain have not introduced any borrower-based measures, 
even though these countries experienced relatively fast house-price increases (left panel of 
Figure 9), and overvaluation is particularly high in Luxembourg, but also sizable in Germany 
and Spain (right panel of Figure 9). Furthermore, Spain has adopted no CCyB, while Luxem-
bourg implemented one of only 0.25 percent in January 2020 and Germany is due to imple-
ment only 0.25 percent as of July 2020. France and Belgium have not adopted borrower-based 
measures even though their residential real estate markets are also overvalued. 
The inconsistencies between residential real estate vulnerability indicators and adopted 
macroprudential measures call for a comparative assessment of cross-country vulnerabilities 
and adopted macroprudential measures.
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Figure 8: Counter-cyclical capital buffers against house price increase (left panel) 
and residential real estate overvaluation (right panel) 
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat for house prices (data is for 2014Q3 to 2019Q3), ESRB for the counter-cyclical capital buffer, and 
the ECB Financial Stability Review November 2019 (Chart 1.14) for residential real estate (RRE) overvaluation. Notes: Counter-cyclical 
capital buffer (CCyB) values correspond to decided rates (as of December 2019), while implementation can start later.
Figure 9: Borrower-based macro-prudential measures against house price 
increase (left panel) and residential real estate overvaluation (right panel)
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat for house prices (data is for 2014Q3 to 2019Q3), ESRB data to calculate the borrower-based 
measures index, and residential real estate (RRE) overvaluation is from Chart 1.14 of ECB (2019c). Note: House price data is for 2014Q3 
to 2019Q3. The Borrower-Based Measure index exhibits a value of zero if no measures have been introduced, one if either measures 
addressing the collateral stretch (LTC & LTV) or the household stretch (DSTI & D/LTI) have been introduce, and two if measures addressing 
both of these have been introduced.
5 Concluding remarks
EU policymakers need to be informed about risks to financial stability and the ECB report 
(ECB, 2019c) provides a great overview of key concerns. 
We have highlighted a few areas that deserve special attention from policymakers based 
on our analysis: housing markets, the low interest-rate environment, climate-related risks and 
cyber risks. Concrete measures can be put in place to address these concerns.
We would also like to emphasise two major macroeconomic topics that interact with 
financial stability. The first is possible risks related to sovereign debt. We concur with the view 
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that risks to sovereign debt are rather limited because rates are very low and therefore the 
budgetary burden of debt is very limited. We would also argue that rate increases in normal 
circumstances are unproblematic. In fact, governments have lengthened the maturity of 
debt, insuring them against the effects of rate raises. More importantly, rate raises are usually 
connected with higher real growth, which should also boost tax revenues to service the debt. 
In the euro area, however, the main concern is that rates could increase because of an average 
increase in real growth, but some countries will not share in the growth increase. We therefore 
caution against fiscal expansion in countries with high debt burdens and low growth poten-
tial.
Second, we would like to stress the importance of more proactive fiscal policies to guard 
against the next downturn. Any major macroeconomic downturn will increase financial sta-
bility risks. Macroeconomic management is therefore not only beneficial for growth and jobs 
but also for financial stability. Policymakers need to understand clearly that there will be little 
scope to use monetary policy tools in the next recession, and should prepare accordingly. In 
fact, interest rates cannot be cut much further and other monetary-policy instruments are 
more limited in their effectiveness. It is therefore the responsibility of fiscal policymakers to 
prepare for the next recession with significantly more proactive fiscal policies than they have 
traditionally pursued.
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